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laws entitling the witness-spouse alone to assert the priv-
ilege, or abolishing the privilege in criminal cases
altogether over a period of 22 years, is not sufficient
reason and experience to dictate a reversal of the unani-
mous Court's holding in Hawkins. Since Burger was un-
willing to state that Trammel overturns Hawkins outright,
his rationale will be deemed weak and poorly reasoned,
even if the effect of his opinion is accepted without further
challenge.
Real Estate Brokers May Be
Guilty of Sherman Act
Violations
by Edwin Bayo
In an opinion announced January 8, 1980, McLain v.
Real Estate Board of New Orleans, 100 S. Ct. 502, the
Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act ex-
tends to an agreement among real estate brokers in a
given market area to conform to a fixed rate of commis-
sions on sales of residential property. A broker's commis-
sion is usually stated as a percentage of the sales price.
The average rate on sales of residential property is be-
tween five and seven percent.
Petitioner's main claim in District Court was that re-
spondent brokers had engaged in a price-fixing conspira-
cy in violation of Section One of the Sherman Act by
means of an agreement to adopt a uniform rate of com-
missions on sales of residential property. To establish the
requisite interstate commerce component necessary for
jurisdiction under the act, petitioners claimed that the
brokerage activities of respondents "were within the flow
of interstate commerce and have an effect upon that
commerce." McLain, supra at 506. In support of this, it
was alleged that respondents assisted persons moving in
and out of the state in buying or selling houses, and that
they also assisted clients in securing financing and title
insurance from sources out of state.
Both parties and the District Court agreed that Gold-
farb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), is the
controlling precedent. In Goldfarb, the Supreme Court
held that Section One of the Sherman Act had been
violated by conformance with a bar association's mini-
mum fee schedule which provided for a title search fee of
one percent of the value of the property. Although the
title search was a purely local activity, it was a prerequisite
to obtaining financing and title insurance. Since a signifi-
cant amount of funds for financing the purchase of homes
came from out of state, the Court stated: "Given the
substantial volume of commerce involved and the in-
separability of this particular legal service from the inter-
state aspects of real estate transactions, we conclude that
interstate- commerce has been sufficiently affected."
Goldfarb, supra at 785.
In applying the rationale of Goldfarb to the present
case, the District Court held that petitioners could estab-
lish federal jurisdiction only by showing that a 'substan-
tial' volume of interstate commerce was involved in the
overall real estate transaction and that the broker's ser-
vices were an essential, integral part of the transaction,
inseparable from the interstate aspect. Since a real estate
broker is not indispensible or necessary in order to buy or
sell a house, the District Court dismissed the complaint.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Sherman
Act jurisdiction did not exist because petitioners had failed
to demonstrate that real estate brokers are either neces-
sary or integral participants in the interstate aspects of
residential real estate financing and title insurance.
The Supreme Court held that the complaint should not
have been dismissed at this stage of the proceedings. "To
establish the jurisdictional element of a Sherman Act
violation it would be sufficient for petitioners to demon-
strate a substantial effect on interstate commerce gener-
ated by respondents' brokerage activity. Petitioners need
not make the more particularized showing of an effect on
interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy to
fix commission rates, or by those other aspects of respon-
dents' activity that are alleged to be unlawful." McLain,
supra at 509. The Supreme Court disagreed with the
restrictive interpretation of Goldfarb given by the District
Court and the Court of Appeals. The Court stated
"[t] he Goldfarb holding was not addressed to the 'effect
on commerce' test of jurisdiction and in no way restricted
it to those challenged activities that have an integral re-
lationship to an activity in interstate commerce." McLain,
supra at 510.
McLain is the latest case in a long line of cases uphold-
ing the broad authority of Congress to regulate activities
that, while local in nature, have an effect on interstate
commerce. Whether this holding will mean monetary
savings to those who employ the services of a real estate
broker in selling or buying a house remains to be seen.
